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Donald Rutherford, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern
Philosophy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. xvi + 422 pp. index. illus. bibl. $29.99.
ISBN: 978–0–521–52962–4.
For a long time, study of early modern philosophy was limited to the canoni-
cal works of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, and Kant, and
reflected contemporary concerns of a predominantly analytical slant. It focused on
epistemology and metaphysics to the neglect of aesthetics and moral and political
philosophy. Thinkers were neatly divided into two camps, rationalism versus
empiricism. It was quite common to find historians saying that they were only
interested in the logic of some piece of argument, preferably those parts which were
amenable to what Richard Rorty called “rational reconstruction.” In the last few
decades historians have taken a much broader interest, looking also at religious,
institutional, social, and cultural developments. The scientific and philosophical
innovation is no longer treated as a phenomenon on the scale of Athena springing
from Zeus’s head fully grown, but one with roots in medieval scholasticism and
various strands of Renaissance thinking, including the rediscovery of ancient sys-
tems such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, Platonism, and skepticism. The temporary
crown of this historically more sensitive approach is the wonderful Cambridge
History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (1998), weighing in at over 1,500 pages.
On a much smaller scale, this Companion successfully reflects and embraces
these wider perspectives, and as such carries an ambitious character. In a way it is
even more ambitious than the History, since the Companion had apparently to
cover the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while the History only the seven-
teenth. (There is another History, published in 2006, on the eighteenth century.)
This should have provoked some reflection on the concept of early modern, but this
is not undertaken here. The period is conveniently defined as roughly 1600–1800,
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or “Montaigne through Kant” (xiii). On the one end of the spectrum the volume
works with a rather strict demarcation between Renaissance and early modern, as
hardly any Renaissance thinker comes in for discussion. At the other end, the line
is fuzzier: Kant is apparently modern, not early modern, since his philosophy, apart
from his conception of Enlightenment, is not discussed, but Hume’s status is
less clear: his moral philosophy is treated but not his epistemology. The French
philosophes (De Lamettrie, Condillac, Voltaire, and Diderot, with the exception of
Holbach), are wholly absent, and so is Vico and Herder. The discipline of aes-
thetics, gaining a prominent place in French thinking of the period, is not
discussed at all. Early modern, then, seems to be especially a seventeenth-century
phenomenon.
But this is all very understandable, and we should be grateful for what the
book does contain. In a series of twelve authoritative essays the reader is guided
through the vast and complicated world of early modern debates on a host of
issues. The old canon is well-represented but many other figures make a more than
fleeting appearance too, such as Michel de Montaigne, Francisco Suárez, Hugo
Grotius, Pierre Gassendi, Nicholas Malebranche, Pierre Bayle, Samuel Pufendorf,
and Thomas Reid. There are essays on epistemology, natural philosophy, and
science (S. Gaukroger and D. Des Chene), metaphysics (N. Jolley), the science of
mind (T. Schmaltz), language and logic (M. Losonsky), moral philosophy (S.
James, S. Darwall), political philosophy (A. J. Simmons), philosophy and religion
(T. Lennon, D. Rutherford), the scholastic traditions (M. Stone), and on the
concept of Enlightenment up to Kant (J. Schneewind). Short biographies and a
full index complement the volume.
Together the essays testify to the immense vitality and innovation of early
modern philosophy. The scholastic world of substantial forms, formal and final
causes, sensible and intelligible species, and all the rest was gradually replaced by
a world of matter in motion, to be described in the language of mathematics. But
the word gradually must be emphasized, for the language of the early modern
philosophers continued to be indebted to earlier traditions, just when trees are
turned into telegraph poles, the grain of the wood remaining visible (to borrow an
apt phrase from John North). This is stressed by various contributors: for example,
by Jolley, who, in his excellent contribution, speaks of new wine in old bottles.
All essays give a state-of-the-art picture of current scholarship and can all be
recommended. Most stimulating and clear I found those by Gaukroger, Des
Chene, Jolley, Simmons, and Lennon. Of course there are minor points on which
one may disagree with a particular author. Darwall provides a stimulating and
wide-ranging discussion of early modern debates on the foundations of morality,
but to my mind starts from the questionable idea that modern ethics arose out of
the ethical skepticism that Hugo Grotius allegedly faced (what Schneewind has
called the “Grotian problematic”). As Brian Tierney, Perez Zagorin, and others
have shown, this only played a marginal role in Grotius’s On the Law of War and
Peace from 1625, and the “if there were no God” formula already occurred in
scholastic sources. It may well be time to review critically this line of interpretation,
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especially now that scholars (such as M. Ayers, D. Perler, and S. Menn) have begun
to qualify the Popkin thesis of the importance of skepticism in the rise of early
modern philosophy. Stone provides a useful “provisional cartography of the most
prominent scholastic schools” but starts unnecessarily on a very defensive note,
arguing that scholasticism is still viewed as “recondite or rebarbative” and “largely
irrelevant” (299), a claim difficult to maintain in the face of much scholarship of
the last twenty years or so. But this makes his plea for recognition of the intrinsic
worth of the scholastic traditions no less important. Unfortunately, however, his
plea remains abstract since he does not zoom in on specific arguments or theories
which would substantiate his claim that, for example, “anyone interested in phi-
losophy will gain something from reading Caramuel” (320, and cf. 309 on John
of St. Thomas); we are not given any indication of what we would gain by doing
so. It would not be too difficult to find other things to quibble over in some of the
other chapters (Losonsky’s reference to outdated scholarship on Agricola and
Ramus; some debatable interpretations of Hobbes in James and Losonsky;
Gaukroger’s statement that in the Middle Ages topics were “exclusively” associated
with “rhetoric” [45]). But this is all to the good; a handbook too should encourage
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